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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
William Thomas Scott, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of delivery of a controlled 
substance within 1,000 feet of a school. Scott claims his conviction should be 
reversed due to statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument to which 
he did not object at trial. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Law enforcement arranged a controlled methamphetamine buy between 
Theresa Staker, a "confidential informant," and Scott. (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-23; p.117, 
Ls.9-18.) Law enforcement recorded telephone calls between Scott and Staker 
planning the purchase, recorded the actual transaction, and conducted 
surveillance when the buy occurred. (Tr., p.117, L.9 - p.122, L.6.) A few weeks 
following the controlled buy, Scott was arrested and charged with delivery of 
methamphetamine with an enhancement because the delivery occurred within 
1,000 feet of a secondary school. (Tr., p.146, Ls.5-11; R., pp.65-66.) 
The state and Scott initially entered into a plea agreement in which Scott 
pied guilty and the state agreed to recommend no more than retained jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.85-99.) After Scott pied guilty, but prior to sentencing, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals issued an opinion holding that the sentencing enhancement for 
delivery within 1,000 feet of a school required imposition of a mandatory term of 
confinement, thereby precluding the court from accepting the state's retained 
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jurisdiction recommendation as contemplated by the agreement. 1 Consequently, 
Scott filed a motion to modify the plea agreement, which was denied, but the 
court allowed Scott to instead withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to a stipulation by 
the parties. (R., pp.108-116, 127-130, 142-144.) The case proceeded to trial 
after which a jury convicted Scott of delivery of a controlled substance within 
1,000 feet of a school. (R., pp.239-250, 283-284.) The court thereafter entered 
judgment imposing a unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed from which 
Scott timely appealed. (R., pp.295-298, 303-305.) 
1 State v. Patterson, 148 Idaho 166,170,219 P.3d 813, 817 (Ct App. 2009). 
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ISSUE 
Scott states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the State's arguments - eight times - that its evidence was 
uncontradicted or undisputed constitute fundamental error in 
violation of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment right not to testify? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Scott failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the 
prosecutor's closing arguments to which he did not object? 
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ARGUMENT 
Scott Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His Unpreserved 
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Scott claims the prosecutor's comments during closing argument 
regarding the "undisputed" evidence at trial, which were not objected to, 
constituted misconduct amounting to fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-
12.) Application of the legal standards governing such claims demonstrates 
Scott has failed to show he is entitled to any relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (201 O) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time 
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. l!;l at 980. 
C. Scott Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In Relation To The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
During closing argument, the prosecutor went through the elements 
instruction and noted the evidence was "undisputed" with regard to the following 
elements: (1) the date of the offense; (2) the location of the offense; (3) and the 
identification of the substance as methamphetamine. (Supp. Tr., p.29, L.9 -
p.30, L.21.) Continuing his review of the elements, the prosecutor stated: 
Also contained within point number three, that it was William 
Scott, the defendant in this case, that delivered that 
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methamphetamine. That evidence is also uncontradicted and 
undisputed. Every witness who had any connection to this case as 
far as the controlled buy or the surveillance connected William 
Scott to that controlled buy in some way. First of all, Theresa 
Staker, very brave initially working as a confidential informant 
[testified] .... 
She had to face Mr. Scott, the man who sold her that 
methamphetamine, and identify him publically in court. She did 
that, and that identification was undisputed. And she testified that 
she had some history with Mr. Scott; that they had been friends for 
a period of time; that they knew each other, so this is not a situation 
where you have an eye witness trying to identify a stranger. She's 
identifying someone that she knows, someone that she recognizes 
and has done things with. 
Her testimony, again, is that he sold her or delivered her 
methamphetamine, and there is no evidence to contradict that. In 
fact, all of the other evidence introduced in this trial corroborates or 
supports her testimony. 
(Supp. Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.24.) 
In addition to reviewing the elements instruction for delivery, the 
prosecutor also discussed Instruction No. 16, which advised the jury that it must 
determine whether the delivery occurred "on or within 1,000 feet" of school 
property. (R., p.272.) With respect to the state's allegation that the delivery 
occurred within 1,000 feet of Burley Junior High School, the prosecutor asserted 
the evidence on that point ''was completely uncontradicted," stating: 
The delivery took place there on 13th Street. That location was 
pinpointed very accurately. The police officer measured that 
distance, and not even going in a straight line but actually taking 
the long way was still well under 1,000 feet to the property of that 
Burley Junior High School. The evidence was it was a public 
school, and it was a secondary school. And that grassy area that 
he measured to is part of the property of that junior high school. 
The principal even went so far as to explain that the students 
actively use that part of the field for classes, for PE, for different 
things like that. And if you add up the distances, it comes to 
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somewhere around 778 feet, and that's even if you're not taking the 
shortest possible distance from that location to the school property. 
(Supp. Tr., p.36, Ls.6-22.) 
Later, in rebuttal, after Scott argued, in essence, that there was 
reasonable doubt because Staker was not credible and the state failed to present 
any evidence other than her testimony that he was the one in the car who 
delivered the methamphetamine to her (see generally Supp. Tr., pp.38-43), the 
prosecutor stated: 
We do have to rely on Theresa Staker to some extent, and 
that's why the police do everything they can to follow all these rules 
and regulations. All of the evidence is documented. They fill out all 
of this paperwork. . . . They do everything they can to make sure 
all of this is on the up-and-up, and there simply is no reasonable 
explanation other than William Scott sold this methamphetamine to 
Theresa Staker. You heard her testimony. You saw her 
demeanor. You saw that she was trying to be open. She was 
being honest. She was telling you what happened, and that 
evidence is uncontradicted. 
Again, even though there was not a law enforcement officer 
literally standing there watching the transaction, they saw William 
Scott's car going to the transaction. You hear the tapes. They saw 
how quickly it happened. They see his vehicle leaving that area. 
They follow it to this home on Conant. They see him right after he's 
gotten out of the car. That's a very strong corroboration. 
You can argue that every witness has some kind of bias or 
some kind of motive. Theresa Staker was an informant. She was 
being compensated. Part of her agreement was that she had to 
promise to tell the truth. You'll see that in the paperwork. It was an 
agreement that was approved by the prosecuting attorney of 
Minidoka County. This wasn't just a police officer deciding to do 
something on a whim. They went through all of the right steps 
here. She was under oath. She promised to tell the truth, and 
there was [no] evidence to contradict that. 
(Supp Tr., p.48, L.22 - p.50, L. 7.) 
6 
Although Scott did not object to any of the prosecutor's statements, and 
even though Scott acknowledges the prosecutor did not "directly" imply guilt 
based on his failure to testify, Scott nevertheless claims his conviction should be 
vacated as a result of the prosecutor's use of the word "undisputed" during 
closing argument and his characterization of the evidence as uncontradicted. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-12.) In order to prevail on this claim, Scott must satisfy 
the three-part test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 245 P .3d 978. 
Application of the foregoing standard to Scott's claim of unpreserved error 
demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to 
reversal of his conviction. 
Scott argues he satisfies the first prong of Perry because the prosecutor's 
comments violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.11.) According to Scott, his Fifth Amendment right was violated because he 
was the only witness who could have contradicted the evidence presented. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Although it may be true that Scott was the only person 
who could contradict Staker's claim that he was the one in the car who sold her 
the methamphetamine, not all of the prosecutor's statements of which Scott 
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complains were related to this point. For example, the date of the incident, the 
location of the controlled buy, including the fact that it occurred within 1,000 feet 
of a school, and the identification of the substance sold as methamphetamine 
could have been contradicted by someone other than Scott. See, ~. State v. 
Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591-592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1054-1055 (1983) 
(prosecutor's remark that testimony regarding nature of substance as cocaine 
was "uncontradicted" did not constitute an impermissible reference to the 
defendant's failure to testify, but was "a comment on the weight of the evidence 
produced"). Any argument that the prosecutor's comments regarding the 
undisputed nature of this evidence violated Scott's Fifth Amendment right lacks 
merit and fails to satisfy Scott's burden of showing a constitutional violation as 
required under the first prong of Perry. 
Scott's complaints about the prosecutor's use of the word "undisputed" in 
relation to Staker's testimony identifying him as the person who sold her the 
methamphetamine and the prosecutor's characterization of her testimony as 
uncontradicted also fails to establish a Fifth Amendment violation. In support of 
his argument to the contrary, Scott relies on State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 
143 P.3d 400 (Ct App. 2006). In McMurry, the Court stated: "Idaho follows the 
overwhelming number of jurisdictions holding that a prosecutor's general 
references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect on the 
defendant's failure to testify, where witnesses other than the defendant could 
have contradicted the evidence." 143 Idaho at 314, 143 P.3d at 402 (emphasis 
original). The Court continued: 
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Looking at the comments in context, including the likely 
effect of any curative instructions, we must decide whether the 
language used was manifestly intended or was of such character 
that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 
comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Although a 
prosecutor may not intend an inference of guilt, sufficiently 
ambiguous language indicates indirect . . . error under the 
objective portion of this test. An "inference on inference," however, 
does not naturally or necessarily make an indirect comment on 
defendant's silence. 
McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315, 143 P.3d at 403 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis original). 
Looking at the prosecutor's comments in this case "in context," there was 
no manifest intent to comment on Scott's failure to testify, nor was the language 
used "of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be 
a comment" thereon. Rather, the intent of the prosecutor's argument was to 
demonstrate that Staker's testimony, which Scott challenged as not credible, was 
in fact corroborated by other evidence in the case, including the recorded phone 
calls and the surveillance conducted by law enforcement before, during, and after 
the controlled buy. Moreover, the state was entitled to respond to Scott's 
challenge to Staker's credibility by highlighting the fact that the only evidence 
presented corroborated her testimony instead of contradicting it. See Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be 
evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it"); State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (citation and quotations omitted) 
(prosecutor's arguments must be evaluated "in light of defense conduct and in 
the context of the entire trial") McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315, 143 P.3d at 403 
(citation and quotations omitted) ("a prosecutor may rebut defense counsel's 
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arguments and defenses" even though "the line between a legitimate rebuttal of 
the defense arguments and an indirect comment on the fact that the defendant 
has not taken the stand is often a very thin one"). Under the facts of this case, 
Scott has failed to show constitutional error. 
Even if the prosecutor's statements that the evidence was undisputed 
resulted in constitutional error, Scott has failed to establish either that the error 
was clear or obvious and the lack of objection was not the result of a tactical 
decision or that the result of the trial would have been different absent the 
prosecutor's comments. With respect to the second prong of Perry, Scott argues 
the error "is plain from the record" because the "terminology - uncontradicted or 
undisputed - [was] disfavored by the Court in McMurry and by other appellate 
courts considering the issue in a case in which the defendant is the only witness 
who could have contradicted the State's evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
This argument fails for at least two reasons. 
First, the mere use of even "disfavored" language does not mean there 
was error. Rather, as the Court made clear in McMurry, the analysis must 
consider the language "in context, including the likely effect of any curative 
instruction," and, as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Severson, the 
prosecutor's statements must be evaluated "in light of defense conduct and in the 
context of the entire trial." 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (citation and 
quotations omitted). Thus, it is not enough to conclude there was error based on 
the prosecutor's choice of words alone. See also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) ("[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' 
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remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."). 
Second, Scott's plain error argument ignores that portion of the 
fundamental error analysis requiring consideration of whether trial counsel's 
failure to object was the result of a tactical decision. Counsel's decision not to 
object to the prosecutor's closing argument could have been a tactical decision 
based on a variety of factors none of which can be ascertained from the record. 
For example, trial counsel may think objecting during closing argument does not 
play well to a jury, or trial counsel, rather than objecting, may prefer to respond or 
capitalize on the state's closing argument instead of objecting to it. Indeed, it is 
possible trial counsel did at least the latter in this case as potentially illustrated by 
the following statement he made during his closing argument: "So when the 
state says this is undisputed, no, it is disputed. The state misstates. It is 
disputed. The state's job is to prove that it's beyond a reasonable doubt, and I 
don't think they've done that." (Supp. Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.42, L.4.) If, in fact, 
counsel did make a tactical decision not to object, such a decision will generally 
not be second-guessed on appeal and would not warrant reversal. State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 566 n.8, 199 P.3d 123, 141 n.8 (2008). Regardless of 
what can be speculated regarding counsel's motives, however, it cannot be said 
that there is "no need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record." Perry, supra. Scott's claim that he has satisfied the second prong of 
Perry, therefore, fails. 
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Scott has also failed to satisfy the third prong of Perry because he has not 
met his burden of demonstrating the argument affected the outcome of the trial. 
Beyond Staker's testimony that Scott was the individual who delivered the 
metharnphetamine to her, the state also presented evidence from investigating 
officers that corroborated Staker's identification of Scott as the dealer. 
Specifically, Detective Kevin Horak testified that he recorded calls between 
Staker and Scott wherein Staker arranged to buy the methamphetamine from 
Scott, and Detective Horak was able to identify Scott's voice on the recordings. 
(Tr., p.117, L.9 - p.122, L.6.) Detective Horak also placed a recording device on 
Staker, which she wore during the controlled buy, and Detective Horak was able 
to identify Scott's voice on the "buy wire" as well. (Tr., p.120, L.2 - p.122, L.6.) 
Further, the vehicle driven by the individual who delivered the methamphetamine 
to Staker during the controlled buy was registered to Scott, Scott was seen 
walking from that same vehicle to a house in a manner indicating he had just 
driven it, and Scott was later arrested while standing near that vehicle. (Tr., 
p.141, L.6 - p.146, L.23.) Thus, contrary to Scott's argument, this case was not 
"based almost exclusively on the testimony of one drug-addicted, drug-dealing 
police informant." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
Moreover, Scott has failed to show any basis for concluding the jury 
disregarded the court's instructions that the prosecutor's arguments did not 
constitute evidence (R., pp.254, 278}, that it must only consider evidence in 
determining guilt (R., p.256), that it was not to draw any inference of guilt from 
Scott's decision not to testify (R., p.273}, and that it must follow all the court's 
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instructions (R., p.256), and instead convicted him based on the prosecutor's 
closing argument. See State v. Carson, --- P.3d ----, 2011 VvL 5299708 (2011) 
(rejecting argument that prosecutor committed misconduct in explaining 
reasonable doubt because the court's instructions were correct and jurors were 
presumed to follow the court's instructions). To the contrary, because the jury is 
presumed to follow the court's instructions and because the evidence of Scott's 
guilt was significant, Scott has not and cannot demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the prosecutor's use of the word "undisputed" or his 
characterization of the state's evidence as uncontradicted affected the outcome 
of the trial. Thus, even assuming Scott could satisfy the first two prongs of Perry, 
he is still not entitled to relief under the third prong. 
Because Scott has failed to establish the prosecutor's closing argument 
constituted fundamental error, he has failed to demonstrate his conviction should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Scott's judgment of 
conviction for delivery of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2011. 
JESSICA 1}11. LORELLO 
Deputy 'f\tforney General 
'-,/ 
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